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Appendix A (Not intended for print publication): Data 
This appendix gives more information on our data, estimation sample, and variables.   
1. KPS ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDS AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 Our main dataset is derived from administrative records of KPS students from the 
graduating classes of 2003 through 2013. From these data, we define graduates based on entry 
and exit codes provided by KPS. 
 From the KPS records, we obtain information about high school of graduation and 
student demographics, including sex, race/ethnicity (Native American, Black, Asian, Hispanic, 
or White), and participation in the federal assisted lunch program (a binary yes/no variable). We 
also obtain data for high school of graduation and academic variables (cumulative GPA, highest 
math class taken, the number of AP classes taken, and whether the student attended the 
Kalamazoo Area Mathematics and Science Center [KAMSC]). Except for lunch status, we 
observe each of these variables for every high school graduate. We do not observe lunch status 
for the class of 2003; instead, we impute this variable as described in section 1.2, below. 
1.1 Definition of Kalamazoo Promise Eligibility  
 We use the KPS student entry and withdrawal records to construct our key explanatory 
variable, the indicator for whether a high school graduate is eligible for the Kalamazoo Promise. 
The KPS school tenure records go back to the 1996–1997 school year, which allows us to track 
continuous enrollment histories for most students, although earlier cohorts have truncated 
histories. For example, for the high school class of 2003, we observe records back to sixth grade 
(if the student graduated on time), but not earlier.  
For the graduates from the classes of 2003 through 2005—the pre-Promise period—we 
define an eligibility variable that equals one if the student would have been eligible for any 
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tuition subsidy (65 percent or more) had the Kalamazoo Promise been in effect at that time, and 
zero otherwise. We define a student as eligible if he or she resided in the district and had been 
continuously enrolled in KPS from before the fall count date in ninth grade. If the student 
enrolled after the ninth-grade fall count date, or was not a district resident, we count that student 
as ineligible in accord with Promise rules. In the post-Promise period (2006–2013), we use 
administrative records directly from the Kalamazoo Promise. In Appendix D, we present results 
where we use the algorithm to determine eligibility throughout the entire sample.  
Appendix Table A1 compares Promise eligibility based on administrative data to Promise 
eligibility based on the algorithm and shows a close match: out of 3,947 observations in the post-
Promise period, 3,400 are scored as eligible by both the algorithm and the administrative data 
and 371 are scored as ineligible by both the algorithm and the administrative data. Only 5 
observations show eligibility under the algorithm but not in the administrative data. These cases 
appear to be special-education students who were not district residents; in our data, the special 
education code takes precedence over the code identifying resident status. For 171 observations, 
the algorithm finds that these students should not be eligible even though they apparently are. 
The majority of these are high-risk students who have moved in and out of KPS and thus had 
breaks in their continuous enrollment; however, about one-third are students who successfully 
appealed their eligibility with Promise administrators. We show below that our main results are 
robust to excluding cases where there is a disagreement between the algorithm and the 






Appendix Table A1: Eligibility and Ineligibility Comparison between Administrative 






















2006 22 2 59 366 449 
2007 28 1 41 434 504 
2008 16 1 53 414 484 
2009 31 1 45 389 466 
2010 21 0 46 431 498 
2011 26 0 48 433 507 
2012 16 0 49 461 526 
2013 11 0 30 472 513 
            
Total 171 5 371 3,400 3,947 
 
1.2 Free or Reduced Lunch Program Participation in 2003 
 Because the KPS data do not record whether students participated in the federal assisted 
lunch program in 2003, we impute this variable using data from the other two pre-Promise years, 
2004 and 2005. Using data for these two years, we predict the probability that a student is on the 
federal assisted lunch program by logistic regression of the lunch status dummy on a fully 
saturated (i.e., all possible interactions) vector of controls: gender, race/ethnicity, and high 
school indicator. The regression also includes achievement variables: cumulative school-year-
level GPA as a cubic spline, cumulative AP classes taken, dummies for the highest math class 
taken, and a dummy for whether the student participated in the math and science magnet 
program.  
We define a student as participating in the lunch program using the following two-step 
procedure. First, using a random-number generator, we create a variable that is uniformly 
distributed from 0 to 1. Second, we assign a student to the lunch program if the predicted value 
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of a student’s lunch-program participation probability exceeds his or her corresponding random-
number value.  
2. DESCRIPTION OF NSC DATA  
 The National Student Clearinghouse (NSC) is a nonprofit organization that tracks student 
enrollment at nearly all postsecondary institutions at which students can receive federal financial 
aid. Through the StudentTracker service, school districts can submit student names and birth 
dates, and NSC will match with their database and return postsecondary enrollment records. We 
obtained StudentTracker data from KPS covering the high school graduating classes of 2003 
through 2013 and the enrollment periods of Fall 2003 through Spring 2014.   
The data provide the college attended for each term’s enrollment. They also record the 
intensity of enrollment (full-time, half-time, less than half-time, and whether the student 
withdrew). We also observe whether a credential was received, the type of credential, and the 
date of receipt. Together these data are used to construct our outcome variables.  
We are able to match more than 97 percent of the KPS graduates in our data to NSC 
records (Appendix Table A2).1 Of the unmatched, nearly half are from 2003: for this year, NSC 
reports no graduates from KPS’s alternative high school. Our estimates control for high school of 
graduation by year, so this exclusion is not problematic.  
Appendix Table A2: Final Match Rates  
Class year 
Final Matched Estimation 
Sample 
All KPS grads 
2003 525 585 
2004 551 552 
2005 392 393 
2006 449 457 
2007 504 522 
                                                 
1 Discrepancies between the two columns are primarily, but not exclusively, due to failed NSC matches. A very few 
additional graduates lacked core data, such as graduation date.  
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2008 484 501 
2009 466 467 
2010 498 500 
2011 507 522 
2012 526 531 
2013 513 519 
Total 5,415 5,549 
Note: All KPS grads refer to graduates earning a regular high school diploma. 
 
Although the match rate is high, the NSC has shortcomings. As detailed by Dynarski, 
Hemelt, and Hyman (2015), NSC data do not cover all colleges, especially in the earlier period, 
and some records are blocked because of student or school requests under the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). They show that coverage ranged from about 83 
percent of students in 2003 to 90 percent in 2011. For Michigan colleges, coverage was slightly 
lower than for the nation in 2003 and slightly higher in 2011. For-profit institutions have lower 
coverage than other institution types.  
 The most relevant coverage issue for this paper is for Kalamazoo Valley Community 
College (KVCC), the local public two-year school, which approximately one-third of KPS 
graduates attend. KVCC did not provide student records to NSC before 2005. As a substitute, we 
obtained equivalent data for KPS graduates for the Summer 2003 through Summer 2005 period 
directly from KVCC upon special request, in cooperation with KPS and the Kalamazoo Promise. 
There are other schools for which NSC coverage began during our sample period, but none are 
(or were) attended in large numbers by KPS graduates.2  
2.1 Construction of Outcome Variables 
                                                 
2 Within Michigan, coverage for Wayne State University (four-year public) and Washtenaw Community College 
(two-year public) began in 2004, Michigan Tech University (four-year public) began in 2008, Baker College of Flint 
and Davenport University (both four-year private nonprofit) began in 2009, and Everest Institute of Kalamazoo 
(four-year for-profit) began in 2011. Outside of Michigan, coverage for the University of Phoenix began in 2006. 
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 The NSC data contain the dates enrollment begins and ends for each college attended. 
We combine these data with dates of high school graduation to determine whether and what type 
of postsecondary institution was attended within different time frames of high school graduation. 
We do not count college enrollment that began before high school graduation (i.e., dual 
enrollment).  
The NSC data do not contain the number of credits attempted or earned, but they do 
contain a measure of enrollment intensity: full-time, half-time, less than half-time, or withdrawn. 
For institutions on a semester system, we assign 12 credits, 6 credits, 3 credits, and 0 credits 
attempted to each of the categories, respectively. For institutions on a trimester or quarter 
system, we assign credits per term that are proportionally adjusted to accord with the semester 
system over a standard academic year. We determine timing based on enrollment end dates and 
high school graduation dates, as above. The credit assignments are approximations, but as long 
as actual credits attempted to do not differentially vary by eligibility over time, our estimates 
should not be biased. The NSC data also provide the type and date of degrees or credentials 
earned, separately from enrollment.   
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Appendix B (Not intended for print publication): Results Estimated Using Inverse 
Probability Weighting 
  
To implement the inverse probability reweighting, we first estimate via logit the 
propensity score, p(x) = Pr(Pre-Promise = 1|x), where “Pre-Promise” equals 1 if the student 
graduated before the Promise, and is 0 otherwise.3 We assign a weight, w(x) = 
𝑝(𝑥)
1−𝑝(𝑥)
 , if pre-
Promise = 0, and w(x) = 1 if pre-Promise = 1. We use the propensity score to reweight the 
students in the post-Promise period so that the distribution of covariates x of students in the post-
Promise period resembles that of students in the pre-Promise period (DiNardo, Fortin, and 
Lemieux 1996). We perform this reweighting procedure separately for eligible and ineligible 
students. These w(x) weights are then used to run weighted least squares difference-in-
differences regressions. Table B1 shows how the distribution of covariates changes in the post-
Promise period because of these weights.4 The reweighting eliminates all significant differences 
in covariates between the pre-Promise and post-Promise periods for each eligibility group and 
helps to account for the fact that post-Promise, there is some negative selection (based on 
observables) into the group of eligible students. The reweighting is an empirically-based method 
of controlling for both linear and non-linear effects of observables upon outcomes. While this 
has advantages, it cannot control for unobservables.  
 
  
                                                 
3 Our propensity score reweighting fully saturates the logit model with the various discrete variables controlling for 
gender, race, and free or reduced-price lunch status. In contrast, the control-variable approach includes each discrete 
variable without the interaction terms, as in previous studies.  
4 We have confirmed that there is common support among the discrete demographic cells used for reweighting, with 
the exception of a handful of observations that are omitted from the reweighted regressions. A histogram of the 
propensity scores is available upon request. 
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Appendix Table B1  Descriptive Statistics, Reweighted Sample 
  No reweighting 
 
Reweighting 
Variable Before After Diff p-val 
 
Before After Diff p-val 







  Male 0.470 0.477 0.007 0.660 0.470 0.470 −0.000 0.998 
  Black 0.346 0.416 0.070 0.000 
 
0.346 0.346 0.001 0.972 
  Asian 0.017 0.026 0.009 0.047 
 
0.017 0.016 −0.001 0.852 
  Hispanic 0.049 0.075 0.026 0.001 
 
0.049 0.049 −0.001 0.919 
  White 0.584 0.473 −0.111 0.000 
 
0.584 0.585 0.001 0.954 
  Subsid. lunch 0.340 0.547 0.207 0.000 
 
0.340 0.339 −0.001 0.946 
  High school 1 0.491 0.525 0.035 0.036 
 
0.491 0.491 0.001 0.963 
  High school 2 0.446 0.396 −0.050 0.002 
 









  Male 0.442 0.439 −0.003 0.938 0.442 0.457 0.015 0.745 
  Black 0.481 0.532 0.051 0.220  0.481 0.498 0.018 0.709 
  Asian 0.056 0.037 −0.019 0.302  0.056 0.044 −0.011 0.609 
  Hispanic 0.086 0.077 −0.009 0.705  0.086 0.084 −0.001 0.961 
  White 0.369 0.340 −0.029 0.474  0.369 0.365 −0.004 0.922 
  Subsid. lunch 0.541 0.662 0.121 0.003  0.541 0.543 0.002 0.965 
  High school 1 0.399 0.546 0.146 0.000  0.399 0.403 0.003 0.937 
  High school 2 0.373 0.338 −0.035 0.374  0.373 0.388 0.015 0.745 
NOTE: See Table 2. See text for details of reweighting procedure.  
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from KPS and Kalamazoo Promise administrative data. 
 
 Appendix Tables B2 through B5 present the IPW estimates, and compare these estimates 
with the original OLS estimates. In general, the IPW estimates are quite similar. Where they 
differ slightly, the IPW estimates tend to be somewhat larger in magnitude. Therefore, the OLS 
estimates presented in the text are conservative estimates of Promise effects to the extent that 
they do not fully account for (non-linear) negative selection into the eligible group in the post-




Appendix Table B2  Promise Effects on Enrollment: OLS and IPW 
 (1) (2) 
Panel A:  Enrollment within 6 months   
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.612   
After × Eligible 0.083** 0.093** 
 [0.042] [0.045] 
R2 0.150 0.188 
Panel B:   Enrollment within 12 months     
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.673   
After × Eligible 0.059 0.074* 
 [0.041] [0.044] 
R2 0.164 0.206 
Panel C:  Enrollment at 4-yr. within 6 months   
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.402   
After × Eligible 0.094** 0.124*** 
 [0.038] [0.040] 
R2 0.184 0.193 
Panel D:  Enrollment at 4-yr. within 12 months   
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.411   
After × Eligible 0.089** 0.121** 
 [0.039] [0.041] 
R2 0.187 0.193 
Use IPW? N Y 
NOTE: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, 0.05, or 
0.10. Outcome timing is since high school graduation. Regressions include dummies for after the Promise, 
individual (pseudo-)eligibility, sex, race/ethnicity, free/reduced-price lunch status, and high school of graduation-
by-graduation year. The mean of the dependent variable is for eligible population in the pre-Promise period. 
Sample size is 5,415. 
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Appendix Table B3  Promise Effects on Enrollment by Type of School: OLS and IPW 
 (1)  (2) 
Panel A:   Enroll at a Promise school within 6 months  
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.480   
After × Eligible 0.178*** 0.182*** 
 [0.042] [0.046] 
R2 0.138 0.161 
Panel B:  Enroll at a 4-yr. Promise school within 6 months  
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.281   
After × Eligible 0.168*** 0.195*** 
 [0.035] [0.037] 
R2 0.161 0.172 
Panel C:  Enroll at a 4-yr. non-Promise school within 6 months  
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.132   
After × Eligible −0.095*** −0.089*** 
 [0.023] [0.023] 
R2 0.041 0.042 
Use IPW? N Y 
NOTE: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, 0.05, or 
0.10. Outcome timing is since high school graduation. Regressions include dummies for after the Promise, 
individual (pseudo-)eligibility, sex, race/ethnicity, free/reduced-price lunch status, and high school of graduation-
by-graduation year. The mean of the dependent variable is for the eligible population in the pre-Promise period. 






Appendix Table B4  Promise Effects on Credits Attempted: OLS and IPW 
 (1) (2) 
Panel A:  Credits attempted at 2 years   
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 25.00   
After × Eligible 3.24** 4.05** 
 [1.65] [1.78] 
R2 0.202 0.217 
Panel B:  Credits attempted at 3 years     
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 36.11   
After × Eligible 4.31* 5.70** 
 [2.47] [2.61] 
R2 0.215 0.226 
Panel C:  Credits attempted at 4 years   
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 46.59   
After × Eligible 6.56* 8.80** 
 [3.36] [3.51] 
R2 0.209 0.218 
Use IPW? N Y 
NOTE: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, 0.05, or 
0.10. Outcome timing is since high school graduation. Regressions include dummies for after the Promise, 
individual (pseudo-)eligibility, sex, race/ethnicity, free/reduced-price lunch status, and high school of graduation-




Appendix Table B5 Promise Effects on Degree Attainment: OLS and IPW 
 (1) (2) 
Panel A:  Any credential at 4 years   
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.186   
After × Eligible 0.008 0.016 
 [0.031] [0.034] 
R2 0.087 0.076 
Panel B:  Any credential at 6 years     
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.360   
After × Eligible 0.102** 0.121** 
 [0.046] [0.051] 
R2 0.146 0.132 
Panel C:  BA/BS at 4 years   
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.143   
After × Eligible 0.001 0.007 
 [0.023] [0.027] 
R2 0.116 0.101 
Panel D:  BA/BS at 6 years   
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.= 1) = 0.300   
After × Eligible 0.074* 0.094** 
 [0.040] [0.045] 
R2 0.179 0.160 
Use IPW? N Y 
NOTE: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, 0.05, or 
0.10. Outcome timing is since high school graduation. Regressions include dummies for after the Promise, 
individual (pseudo-)eligibility, sex, race/ethnicity, free/reduced-price lunch status, and high school of graduation-
by-graduation year. The mean of the dependent variable is for the eligible population in the pre-Promise period. 






Appendix C (Not intended for print publication): Other Results Estimated Using the 
Between-District MCER Analysis Sample 
  
This appendix presents a more complete set of results for the between-district estimates 
of the effects of the Kalamazoo Promise. Appendix Table C1 presents pre- and post-Promise 
summary statistics for KPS, other districts in the Middle Cities Education Association (MCEA), 
and other Michigan districts statewide. 
Appendix Table C2 present difference-in-differences estimates of Promise effects, 
comparing KPS to MCEA districts (first two panels), and KPS to all other Michigan districts 
(last two panels). The MCEA includes most predominantly urban districts in the state of 
Michigan, except Detroit Public Schools. 
In Appendix Figures C1 through C6, we use the cross-district data to analyze Promise 
effects using the synthetic control method of Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010). The 
synthetic control method is motivated by the observation that a weighted average of non-treated 
districts can be a better counterfactual of a treated district than any single district. In practice, the 
synthetic control method allows us to use data-driven methods to select a suitable weighted 





Table C1 Descriptive Statistics for KPS, MCEA districts, and all other Michigan districts  
  KPS MCEA districts other than KPS All other districts 
 Post-period Pre-period Overall Post-period Pre-period Overall Post-period Pre-period Overall 
Enrollment in 4 year within 6 months 45.7% 35.9% 43.0% 26.4% 22.8% 25.4% 38.6% 31.8% 36.8% 
Enrollment in public 4 year within 6 months 41.6% 26.2% 37.4% 18.5% 17.1% 18.1% 27.9% 24.3% 27.0% 
Enrollment in flagship within 6 months 12.7% 6.4% 11.0% 4.0% 4.7% 4.2% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 
Enrollment in other 4 year within 6 months 4.2% 9.8% 5.7% 7.9% 5.6% 7.3% 10.7% 7.5% 9.9% 
Degree completion within 6 years 37.1% 35.1% 36.1% 25.5% 26.9% 26.1% 36.4% 36.3% 36.3% 
Bachelor's completion within 6 years 31.6% 30.2% 30.9% 19.3% 20.0% 19.6% 29.8% 29.1% 29.5% 
Student teacher ratio 18.4 16.9 18.0 18.9 28.6 21.5 19.8 24.4 21.0 
Percent FRL 56.4% 47.4% 53.9% 52.1% 38.4% 48.3% 32.6% 23.2% 30.2% 
Percent Black 46.3% 42.8% 45.3% 39.5% 34.3% 38.1% 15.4% 13.5% 14.9% 
Percent White 40.1% 47.3% 42.1% 51.4% 58.0% 53.2% 76.5% 80.2% 77.4% 
Percent Hispanic 7.7% 6.5% 7.4% 5.7% 4.9% 5.5% 3.8% 2.8% 3.5% 
Percent other non-White 5.9% 3.4% 5.2% 2.9% 2.6% 2.8% 4.0% 3.3% 3.8% 
SOURCE: Authors' calculations using the Michigan Consortium for Educational Research (MCER) data of district by year averages.  
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Table C2  Promise Effects on Enrollment and Completion using Between-District 
Analysis (MCEA and all districts, with and without linear time trends) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) 














MCEA: with district time trends 
               
After × KPS 0.071** 0.110** −0.039* 0.085**  0.061 0.039 
Robust standard error [0.024] [0.019] [0.013] [0.026]  [0.044] [0.040] 
Permutation p-value 0.032 0.032 0.065 0.032  0.258 0.258 
Mean DV 0.259 0.181 0.0781 0.0414  0.238 0.179         
MCEA: without district time trends 
               
After × KPS 0.059** 0.135** −0.076** 0.072**  0.030 0.020 
Robust standard error [0.019] [0.012] [0.011] [0.010]  [0.018] [0.015] 
Permutation p-value 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032  0.161 0.194         
All districts: with district time trends 
               
After × KPS 0.041 0.082** −0.041* 0.080*  0.038 0.020 
Robust standard error [0.024] [0.017] [0.012] [0.025]  [0.048] [0.037] 
Permutation p-value 0.116 0.031 0.055 0.055  0.308 0.382 
Mean DV 0.328 0.236 0.092 0.054  0.331 0.257         
All districts: without district time trends 
               
After × KPS 0.033 0.120** −0.088** 0.066**  0.024 0.011 
Robust standard error [0.018] [0.012] [0.011] [0.010]  [0.017] [0.011] 
Permutation p-value 0.153 0.025 0.027 0.025  0.210 0.288                 
NOTE: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, 0.05, or 
0.10. p-value is obtained using a placebo-regression permutation inference described in the text. Regressions 
include district-by-year proportions of students to teachers, students eligible for subsidized lunch, white students, 
nonwhite students, and Hispanic students. For observations missing a covariate, we include a dummy for missing 
and assign the sample mean. The regressions control for district fixed effects and year-of-graduation time effects. 
Observations are weighted by the number of graduates in each district-year. The mean of the dependent variable 
is for the control districts in the pre-Promise period. The control districts consist either of the Michigan Middle 
Cities Education Association (MCEA) districts (top two panels) or of all districts in Michigan (bottom two 
panels).  
Synthetic Control Protocol  
We begin with the potential synthetic control donor pool of 511 districts. We keep only 
those with a full balanced panel across years, which reduces the set to 315 districts. Taking 
averages across time, we drop districts whose values for the outcomes and student-teacher ratio, 
percent free or reduced- price lunch (FRL), and percent white differ by more than 2.43 standard 
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deviations of the statewide distribution from KPS’s values, leaving a donor pool of 100 districts. 
Most of the districts trimmed from the donor pool have either high concentrations of whites or 
very low concentrations of FRL students; however, a few very highly nonwhite and high FRL 
districts are also trimmed. Districts whose share of FRL students were within [0.039, 0.909] and 
whose white student share were within [0.021, 0.924] are kept; these two variables drive much of 
the trimming.  
We use the “synth” command in Stata, with KPS as the treated unit, selecting the 2003 
and 2005 values of the outcome variable and the average values over 2003–2005 of the student-
teacher ratio, percent FRL, and percent white as the matching variables.  
For inference, we repeat this procedure, assigning each of the other donor pool districts to 
be the treated unit. We collect both the treated unit’s treatment effect and the synthetic control’s 
treatment effect for each run of “synth” and calculate their difference for each year, along with 
the root mean squared predicted errors (RMSPE).  
Finally, we plot the net effect of the Promise across time for all the districts whose 
RMSPE is less than a specified cutoff in terms of multiples of KPS’s RMSPE. Our preferred 
cutoff is 1.25 x KPS’s RMSPE. Below, we present result figures from this analysis.  
The results are roughly consistent with the between-district regression analysis. For 
college enrollment outcomes, synthetic controls closely match KPS before the Promise, and 
Promise effects are unusually high relative to those of placebo districts. For degree completion 
outcomes, synthetic controls match KPS less closely before the Promise, and effects, while 
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Appendix D (Not intended for print publication): Other robustness checks  
This appendix presents further robustness checks that include estimates from models that 
allow student characteristics to affect outcomes differentially before and after the Promise and 
estimates from models that use an alternative definition of the eligibility indicator.  
The first column of each table in this appendix presents the estimated effect of the 
Promise using the baseline eligibility indicator, i.e., the indicator obtained from administrative 
data. The second column in each table shows the estimated effect of the Promise using the 
baseline eligibility indicator but allowing student characteristics to vary with the outcome over 
time by interacting the characteristics with an “After” dummy. 
As shown in Appendix Table A1, there is slight disagreement between Promise eligibility 
as determined by the algorithm (predicted eligibility) and eligibility as determined by the 
administrative data. In the third column of each table, we show the estimated effect of the 
Promise using the algorithm-based eligibility indicator. Lastly, the fourth column presents 
estimates that use the algorithm-based eligibility indicator and that additionally interact student 
characteristics with the “After” dummy.  
We expect the algorithm-only results to be biased toward zero, as this specification treats 
as ineligible some students who are in fact eligible. These 171 exceptions are disproportionately 
disadvantaged: 68 percent are African-American, 81 percent are eligible for assisted lunch, and 
28 percent graduated from the alternative high school; for students for whom both the 
administrative data and algorithm find ineligible, the respective numbers are 51 percent, 61 
percent, and 16 percent. However, the exceptions may be especially motivated to attend college, 
even if their characteristics make them unlikely to complete it. This observable selection—that 
the exception students are marginal on college enrollment but likely not on completion—
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suggests that algorithm results (relative to the baseline results) should be more attenuated for the 
enrollment outcomes than completion outcomes. 
Indeed, the appendix tables generally show this pattern: lower magnitudes of Promise 
effects for the enrollment-only eligibility results, but for the critical six-year completion results, 
the estimates are quite similar using either eligibility indicator.  





Appendix Table D1  Promise Effects on Enrollment: Robustness Checks  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A:  Enrollment within 6 months 
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.612 
After × Eligible 0.083** 0.106** 0.049 0.076* 
 [0.042] [0.042] [0.039] [0.040] 
R2 0.150 0.156 0.150 0.156 
Panel B:   Enrollment within 12 months  
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.673 
After × Eligible 0.059 0.084** 0.016 0.044 
 [0.041] [0.041] [0.039] [0.039] 
R2 0.164 0.172 0.161 1.700 
Panel C:  Enrollment at 4-yr. within 6 months 
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.402 
After × Eligible 0.094** 0.096*** 0.049 0.051 
 [0.038] [0.039] [0.037] [0.037] 
R2 0.184 0.185 0.182 0.183 
Panel D:  Enrollment at 4-yr. within 12 months 
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.411 
After × Eligible 0.089** 0.087** 0.042 0.040 
 [0.039] [0.040] [0.037] [0.038] 
R2 0.187 0.188 0.185 0.185 
Eligibility Measure Baseline Baseline Algorithm Algorithm 
X coefficients vary before and after? No Yes No Yes 
NOTE: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, 0.05, or 
0.10. Outcome timing is since high school graduation. Regressions include dummies for after the Promise, 
individual (pseudo-)eligibility, sex, race/ethnicity, free/reduced-price lunch status, and high school of graduation-
by-graduation year. The mean of the dependent variable is for eligible population in the pre-Promise period. 





Appendix Table D2  Promise Effects on Enrollment Sector: Robustness Checks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A:   Enroll at a Promise school within 6 months 
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.480 
After × Eligible 0.178*** 0.192*** 0.134*** 0.151*** 
 [0.042] [0.043] [0.040] [0.041] 
R2 0.138 0.142 0.136 0.141 
Panel B:  Enroll at a 4-yr. Promise school within 6 months  
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.281 
After × Eligible 0.168*** 0.158*** 0.115*** 0.106*** 
 [0.035] [0.036] [0.034] [0.034] 
R2 0.161 0.162 0.158 0.159 
Panel C:  Enroll at a 4-yr. non-Promise school within 6 months 
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.132 
After × Eligible −0.095*** −0.086*** −0.084*** −0.075*** 
 [0.023] [0.023] [0.021] [0.021] 
R2 0.042 0.044 0.042 0.044 
Eligibility Measure Baseline Baseline Algorithm Algorithm 
X coefficients vary before and after? No Yes No Yes 
NOTE: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, 0.05, or 
0.10. Outcome timing is since high school graduation. Regressions include dummies for after the Promise, 
individual (pseudo-)eligibility, sex, race/ethnicity, free/reduced-price lunch status, and high school of graduation-
by-graduation year. The mean of the dependent variable is for eligible population in the pre-Promise period. 





Appendix Table D3  Promise Effects on School Choice: Robustness Checks 
 
Panel A:  Enroll at a given school within 6 months, Baseline 
 KVCC WMU MSU UM Flagships K 
After × Eligible 0.011 0.072** 0.056*** 0.010 0.066*** 0.003 
(fixed coefficients) [0.038] [0.029] [0.015] [0.012] [0.019] [0.010] 
       
After × Eligible 0.033 0.085** 0.045*** 0.006 0.051*** 0.008 
(time-varying coefficients) [0.038] [0.030] [0.015] [0.011] [0.018] [0.010] 
       
Panel B:  Enroll at a given school within 6 months, Algorithm 
 KVCC WMU MSU UM Flagships K 
After × Eligible 0.022 0.049* 0.046*** 0.003 0.049*** 0.002 
(fixed coefficients) [0.036] [0.028] [0.015] [0.011] [0.018] [0.010] 
 
      
After × Eligible 0.046 0.063** 0.035*** −0.001 0.034* 0.008 
(time-varying coefficients) [0.036] [0.029] [0.015] [0.011] [0.018] [0.010] 
              
NOTE: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, 0.05, or 
0.10. See note to Table 4A. KVCC stands for Kalamazoo Valley Community College, WMU stands for Western 
Michigan University, MSU stands for Michigan State University, UM stands for University of Michigan-Ann 





Appendix Table D4  Promise Effects on Credits Attempted: Robustness Checks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A:  Credits attempted at 2 years 
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 25.00 
After × Eligible 3.24** 3.42** 0.97 1.21 
 [1.65] [1.66] [1.56] [1.58] 
R2 0.202 0.203 0.199 0.200 
N 4,902 4,902 4,902 4,902 
Panel B:  Credits attempted at 3 years 
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 36.11 
After × Eligible 4.31* 4.41* 1.33 1.51 
 [2.47] [2.49] [2.32] [2.35] 
R2 0.215 0.215 0.212 0.213 
N 4,376 4,376 4,376 4,376 
Panel C:  Credits attempted at 4 years 
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 46.59 
After × Eligible 6.56* 6.64* 2.49 2.66 
 [3.36] [3.39] [3.17] [3.21] 
R2 0.209 0.210 0.207 0.208 
N 3,869 3,869 3,869 3,869 
Eligibility Measure Baseline Baseline Algorithm Algorithm 
X coefficients vary before and 
after? 
No Yes No Yes 
NOTE: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, 0.05, or 
0.10. Outcome timing is since high school graduation. Regressions include dummies for after the Promise, 
individual (pseudo-)eligibility, sex, race/ethnicity, free/reduced-price lunch status, and high school of graduation-





Appendix Table D5  Promise Effects on Credentials Completed: Robustness Checks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A:  Any credential at 4 years 
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.186 
After × Eligible 0.008 0.007 −0.028 −0.030 
 [0.031] [0.031] [0.030] [0.030] 
R2 0.087 0.089 0.086 0.088 
Panel B:  Any credential at 6 years 
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.360 
After × Eligible 0.102** 0.094** 0.082* 0.073* 
 [0.046] [0.046] [0.043] [0.043] 
R2 0.146 0.149 0.146 0.149 
Panel C:  BA/BS at 4 years 
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.143 
After × Eligible 0.001 0.002 −0.020 −0.019 
 [0.023] [0.023] [0.022] [0.021] 
R2 0.116 0.119 0.115 0.118 
Panel D:  BA/BS at 6 years 
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.= 1) = 0.300 
After × Eligible 0.074* 0.067* 0.056 0.047 
 [0.040] [0.040] [0.037] [0.037] 
R2 0.179 0.181 0.179 0.181 
Eligibility Measure Baseline Baseline Algorithm Algorithm 
X coefficients vary before and after? No Yes No Yes 
NOTE: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, 0.05, or 
0.10. Outcome timing is since high school graduation. Regressions include dummies for after the Promise, 
individual (pseudo-)eligibility, sex, race/ethnicity, free/reduced-price lunch status, and high school of 
graduation-by-graduation year. The mean of the dependent variable is for the eligible population in the pre-





Appendix E (not intended for print publication): Instrumental Variable Estimates of 
Promise Effects 
 
In this appendix, we present estimates where we deal with discrepancies between the 
rules-based Promise eligibility indicator and actual Promise assignment through use of 
instrumental variables. The instrumental variable context is unusual here: in the pre-Promise 
period, there is no discrepancy between the two measures by construction: the Promise did not 
exist so no exceptions to the rules were possible. Furthermore, in the post-Promise period, almost 
all the “error” in Promise eligibility is one-sided, with some students who are ineligible under 
Promise rules being awarded eligibility by Promise administrators. Ordinary 2SLS procedures 
using the full sample would be inefficient—even more than usual—because they would mis-
predict eligibility in the pre-Promise period, when we have perfect assignment.   
To deal with this problem, we use a modified two-step instrumental variable procedure. 
First, we estimate the “effect” of Promise eligibility in the pre-Promise period using OLS (with 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors). That is, we calculate the difference in outcomes by 
Promise pseudo-eligibility, according to the eligibility rules, conditional on observables. Second, 
in the post-Promise period, we estimate the “effects” of Promise eligibility using 2SLS, where 
we instrument actual (administrative) eligibility with eligibility according to the rules-based 
algorithm. 
We then calculate the difference between the 2SLS coefficient on Promise eligibility 
from the post-period and the OLS coefficient on Promise eligibility from the pre-period. The 
standard error of this difference is readily calculated from the standard errors in these two 
distinct samples.  
This procedure is essentially a difference-in-differences procedure. However, it also 
implicitly allows for the coefficients of all the demographic controls to differ between the pre-
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Promise period and the post-Promise period. As shown in Appendix D, this has little effect on 
the estimates.  
Appendix Table E1 presents results from this procedure. These instrumental variable 
estimates are compared with the estimates from Appendix D that use our baseline eligibility 
indicator throughout, but also allow the coefficients on the demographic controls to differ 
between the pre-Promise and post-Promise period. These OLS estimates with time-varying 
observables are the most comparable to the IV estimates, as both methods allow the student 





Appendix Table E1   Comparison between baseline eligibility estimates, and instrumental 
variable (IV) estimates of Promise effects 
      
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable 
OLS estimates  
(with time-varying 
coefficients) IV estimates 
   
Enrollment outcomes        
Enrollment within 6 months 0.106 0.152 
 
(0.042) (0.046) 
   
Enrollment within 12 months 0.084 0.105 
 (0.041) (0.044) 
   
Enrollment at 4-yr. within 6 months 0.096 0.112 
 (0.039) (0.043) 
   
Enrollment at 4-yr. within 12 months 0.087 0.095 
 (0.040) (0.043) 
   
Enroll at a Promise school within 6 months 0.192 0.240 
 (0.043) (0.047) 
   
Enroll at a 4-yr. Promise school within 6 months 0.158 0.176 
 (0.036) (0.040) 
   
Enroll at a 4-yr. non-Promise school within 6 months -0.086 -0.088 
 (0.023) (0.024) 
   
Enroll at KVCC within 6 months 0.033 0.066 
 (0.038) (0.042) 
   
Enroll at WMU within 6 months 0.085 0.096 
 (0.030) (0.033) 
   
Enroll at MSU within 6 months 0.045 0.053 
 (0.015) (0.017) 
   
Enroll at UM within 6 months 0.006 0.004 
 (0.011) (0.013) 
   
Enroll at flagship within 6 months 0.051 0.057 
 (0.018) (0.021) 
   
Enroll at K College within 6 months 0.008 0.012 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
Credits attempted     
   
Credits attempted at 2 years 3.420 3.844 
 (1.660) (1.815) 
   
Credits attempted at 3 years 4.410 5.843 
 (2.490) (2.754) 
   
Credits attempted at 4 years 6.640 8.393 
 (3.390) (3.802) 
Credentials obtained     
   
Any credential at 4 years 0.007 -0.024 
 (0.031) (0.036) 
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Any credential at 6 years 0.094 0.126 
 (0.046) (0.052) 
   
BA/BS at 4 years 0.002 0.001 
 (0.023) (0.026) 
   
BA/BS at 6 years 0.067 0.097 
 (0.040) (0.046) 
      
NOTE: The estimates in column (1) are the baseline estimates from Appendix D allowing the demographic controls 
to have varying coefficients before and after the Promise. These estimates are compared with instrumental variable 
(IV) estimates in column (2). Both sets of estimates condition on observables: sex, race/ethnicity, free/reduced-price 
lunch status, and high school of graduation-by-graduation year. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. KVCC stands for Kalamazoo Valley Community College, WMU stands for Western Michigan 
University, MSU stands for Michigan State University, UM stands for University of Michigan-Ann Arbor, 
Flagships stands for either MSU or UM, and K stands for Kalamazoo College. 
 
 
 As shown in Table E1, the instrumental variable procedure unsurprisingly tends to 
increase standard errors for the usual reasons. More salient, the instrumental variable estimates 
themselves are somewhat greater in magnitude than the baseline.  
 In particular, our bottom-line outcomes “Any credential at 6 years” and “BA/BS at 6 
years” both increase in magnitude by about one-third. The instrumental variable estimates 
suggest that the Promise increases attainment of any credential after six years by 12.6 percentage 
points, and attainment of a BA or BS by 9.7 percentage points.  
 This instrumental variable procedure supports the hypothesis that the estimates presented 




Appendix F (not intended for print publication): Promise analysis restricted to 7th-9th 
grade entrant eligibles 
 
In this appendix, we present estimates in which we restrict the sample of eligible students 
to those entering KPS in 7th through 9th grade (rather than all students who entered before 10th 
grade). As the ineligible group consists of students who first entered in 10th grade or later, by 
making the eligibles a group of earlier movers (rather than long-term KPS students), the intent of 
this restriction is to make the eligible group more comparable to the ineligible group. However, 
in practice, this restriction makes the eligible and ineligible groups less comparable. Students 
who enter KPS at 9th grade come disproportionately from private schools, due to the few private 
high schools in the Kalamazoo area. As a result, the 7th to 9th grade entrants are more advantaged 
than students who have been in KPS for a longer time and those who entered after 9th grade.  
Table F1, which is the analogue to Table 2 in the main text, demonstrates this. For 
example, note the much higher fraction of Promise-eligible white students and the much lower 
fraction of Promise-eligible students eligible for subsidized lunch. This sample restriction 
implies that the estimated average treatment effect of the Promise is on a more-advantaged 
population, one that is less marginal on many college success measures and one that is not 
representative of the actual treated population. Additionally, the restriction diminishes the 
sample size of the eligible group dramatically, hurting precision. We thus believe that estimates 
based on this sample are less compelling in calculating an average treatment effect.  
It is therefore not surprising that in subsequent tables F2–F6 almost all Promise effects 
are severely attenuated, except for substitution among schools. These point estimates are 
effectively estimating a different parameter than in our main estimates, and it is questionable 




Table F1  Descriptive statistics of sample restricted to 7th-9th grade entrant eligibles 
 
    Before After DD  
Variable All Eligibles Ineligibles Eligibles Ineligibles [standard error] 
Demographics        
  Male 0.452 0.377 0.442 0.493 0.439 0.119 [0.062]* 
  Black 0.375 0.188 0.481 0.258 0.532 0.018 [0.056] 
  Asian 0.054 0.052 0.056 0.068 0.037 0.035 [0.028] 
  Hispanic 0.084 0.071 0.086 0.092 0.077 0.029 [0.034] 
  White 0.478 0.688 0.369 0.574 0.340 –0.086 [0.059] 
  Subsid. lunch 0.505 0.266 0.541 0.446 0.662 0.058 [0.059] 
  High school 1 0.484 0.396 0.399 0.505 0.545 –0.037 [0.062] 
  High school 2 0.422 0.591 0.373 0.458 0.338 –0.097 [0.061] 
       
N 1,232 154 233 469 376   
NOTE: Numbers represent authors’ calculations of demographic characteristics of KPS graduates for the classes of 
2003 through 2013 (excluding alternative education programs). From 2006 onward, eligibility is taken from 
administrative records from the Kalamazoo Promise. Before 2006, eligibility is assigned based on Promise rules 
had the Promise been in effect for those cohorts. “Before” represents the cohorts 2003 through 2005; “After” 
represents cohorts 2006 through 2013. “DD” represents the difference between eligibles after and before the 
Promise and ineligibles after and before the Promise; results are not appreciably affected if we use the full 
specification described by equation (1) below. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 





Table F2  Promise effects on enrollment using sample restricted to 7th-9th grade entrant 
eligibles 
 
  (1) 
Panel A:  Enrollment within 6 months  
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.688  
After × Eligible −0.011 
 [0.060] 
R2 0.196 
Panel B:   Enrollment within 12 months   
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.747  
After × Eligible −0.026 
 [0.058] 
R2 0.212 
Panel C:  Enrollment at 4-yr. within 6 months  
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.519  
After × Eligible 0.041 
 [0.059] 
R2 0.217 
Panel D:  Enrollment at 4-yr. within 12 months  
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.532  
After × Eligible 0.039 
 [0.059] 
R2 0.219 
NOTE: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, 0.05, or 
0.10. Outcome timing is since high school graduation. Regressions include dummies for after the Promise, 
individual (pseudo-)eligibility, sex, race/ethnicity, free/reduced-price lunch status, and high school of graduation-
by-graduation year. The mean of the dependent variable is for eligible population in the pre-Promise period. 





Table F3  Promise effects on enrollment by type of school using sample restricted to 7th-
9th grade entrant eligibles 
 
  (1) 
Panel A:   Enroll at a Promise school within 6 months 
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.481  
After × Eligible 0.123* 
 [0.064] 
R2 0.142 
Panel B:  Enroll at a 4-yr. Promise school within 6 months 
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.312  
After × Eligible 0.167*** 
 [0.056] 
R2 0.163 
Panel C:  Enroll at a 4-yr. non-Promise school within 6 months 
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.208  
After × Eligible −0.134*** 
 [0.041] 
R2 0.067 
NOTE: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, 0.05, or 
0.10. Outcome timing is since high school graduation. Regressions include dummies for after the Promise, 
individual (pseudo-)eligibility, sex, race/ethnicity, free/reduced-price lunch status, and high school of graduation-
by-graduation year. The mean of the dependent variable is for the eligible population in the pre-Promise period. 





Table F4  Promise effects on college first attended using sample restricted to 7th-9th 
grade entrant eligibles 
 
Panel A:  Enroll at a given school within 6 months 
 KVCC WMU MSU UM Flagships K 
After × Eligible −0.025 0.070 0.047* −0.006 0.041 −0.027 
 [0.053] [0.046] [0.027] [0.026] [0.037] [0.022] 
       
Mean of DV 0.149 0.149 0.052 0.071 0.123 0.065 
      
Panel B:  Enroll at a given school within 12 months 
 KVCC WMU MSU UM Flagships K 
After × Eligible −0.050 0.074 0.049* −0.006 0.043 −0.027 
 [0.057] [0.047] [0.027] [0.026] [0.037] [0.022] 
       
Mean of DV 0.195 0.156 0.052 0.071 0.123 0.065 
NOTE: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, 0.05, or 
0.10. See note to Table 4A. KVCC stands for Kalamazoo Valley Community College, WMU stands for Western 
Michigan University, MSU stands for Michigan State University, UM stands for University of Michigan-Ann 





Table F5  Promise Effects on credits attempted using sample restricted to 
7th-9th grade entrant eligibles 
 
  (1) 
Panel A:  Credits attempted at 2 years  
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 29.41  




Panel B:  Credits attempted at 3 years   
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 42.97  




Panel C:  Credits attempted at 4 years  
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 56.75  




NOTE: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
p < 0.01, 0.05, or 0.10. Outcome timing is since high school graduation. Regressions include 
dummies for after the Promise, individual (pseudo-)eligibility, sex, race/ethnicity, 
free/reduced-price lunch status, and high school of graduation-by-graduation year. The mean 





Table F6  Promise effects on degree attainment using sample restricted 
to 7th-9th grade entrant eligibles 
 
  (1) 
Panel A:  Any credential at 4 years  
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.260  
After × Eligible −0.002 
 [0.053] 
R2 0.13 
Panel B:  Any credential at 6 years   
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.448  
After × Eligible 0.075 
 [0.071] 
R2 0.17 
Panel C:  BA/BS at 4 years  
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.=1) = 0.247  
After × Eligible −0.038 
 [0.047] 
R2 0.181 
Panel D:  BA/BS at 6 years  
(Mean of DV | after=0, elig.= 1) = 0.422  
After × Eligible 0.019 
 [0.065] 
R2 0.223 
NOTE: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate p < 0.01, 0.05, or 0.10. Outcome timing is since high school graduation. 
Regressions include dummies for after the Promise, individual (pseudo-)eligibility, sex, 
race/ethnicity, free/reduced-price lunch status, and high school of graduation-by-
graduation year. The mean of the dependent variable is for the eligible population in the 
pre-Promise period. Sample sizes are 880 at four years and 701 at six years. 
 
